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DISORDER IN THE COURTS:
THE AFTERMATH OF
SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT
SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ
IN THE STATE COURTS
FRANK

J. MACCHIAROLA ° AND JOSEPH G. DIAz

In recent years, however, a new role for the judicial branch of the
government has been introduced [regarding the issue of financing for
public schools].
The question of funding has taken on a new
dimension which threatens to change the entire set of arrangements
that has traditionally governed the allocation of local and state fiscal
responsibilities for public school education. The problem is based on
court challenges to the current system of financing elementary and
secondary school education on the grounds that current financing
methods do not provide equality of educational opportunity for public
school students in each school district within a state.'
I.

OVERVIEW

This Article examines the changes in judicial strategy by education
advocates for disadvantaged children and school districts. Additionally, this
Article traces the development of school finance strategy, from issues of equity
of funding arrangements among districts within the states to issues of the overall
adequacy of funding arrangements in certain districts within the states. As
education standards have deteriorated generally, the focus of education has
become less on what other favored districts receive by way of competitive
advantage in funding and more on how basic public school education is not
being provided in many, largely urban, school districts, Through it all, there
remains significant dissatisfaction with public schooling and with the action of
state and local authorities to meet the educational needs of children.
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This examination centers around reported cases which have followed San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, where the United States
Supreme Court refused to apply federal constitutional remedies to the underfunding of certain Texas school districts.2 This Article deals with various state
cases prior to Rodriguez and with the flood of cases coming under state
constitutional law that followed Rodriguez. This Article concludes by suggesting
that judicial remedies have been ineffective and consequently inadequate to meet
the schooling needs of our youth.
In The 1974 Municipal Year Book, one of us wrote an article entitled,
"Constitutionaland Legal Dimensions of Public School Financing." 3 In that
article, a number of decisions reached by both the Supreme Court and the courts
of several states regarding the constitutionality of variations in per-pupil school
spending based on local taxing schemes and state aid were discussed.4 Besides
providing the reader with an overview of the law in that particular area, the
question implicitly raised was whether the Supreme Court had failed in its
handling of Rodriguez.5 While the issue of public school finance was a
constitutional "hot" topic of the day, the direction and focus of lawsuits
concerning the issues of financing education have changed significantly. Instead
of finding fault with local and state tax revenue schemes arguing that children
are being educated in violation of their equal rights, more recent actions
challenge the adequacy of public education itself. These claimants argue that
children are being denied the right to a quality education regardless of the issue
of fiscal equity among districts.
Since the Burger Court decided Rodriguez and took away the federal issue,
state courts have come down squarely on both sides of the funding issue in their
application of state constitutional law. Several state courts have concluded that
education is an important right and that the various funding schemes used in the
states are required to comply with state constitutional requirements. In those
states, school funding has been subject to constitutional standards generally
developed by state-wide governmental bodies created by the legislatures or by
the legislature itself. Other states have declined to include education in the
breadth of fundamental rights and have thus avoided applying an analysis that
would adjust the system of school finance used within the state. Those courts
have concluded that variations in school-district funding based on local taxing
schemes and on state aid formulas are rationally related to the goal of local
political control and therefore satisfy legal requirements. These decisions have
allowed courts to stay clear of issues of equity that are more customary in the

2.
3.
4.
5.

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Macchiarola, supra note 1, at 17.
Id. at 17-22.
Id. at 17.
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political process.
This Article will look at three distinct questions regarding Rodriguez and
its progeny. First, it will examine what the courts have said about public school
finance and government spending in light of Rodriguez. Second, this Article
will discuss the merits and consequences of state courts' involvement in the
equity issues pertaining to public school finance. And third, this Article will
discuss what state courts have said about the effectiveness of governmental
spending as it concerns the quality of public education.
The authors conclude that although litigation in public educational finance
has been considerable, results have not been significant in addressing
youngsters' needs in public schools. History has shown that even when fairness
issues are resolved, the problems remain with the effectiveness of that funding.
Schools do not pass the benefits of increased funding on to youngsters. We
contend that any solution through the judicial process will be inadequate. We
believe that seeking a solution to a matter of fundamental fairness through the
adversarial process can give us, at best, limited results. We suggest that while
the courts can identify the wrong, they are incapable of providing effective
remedies by adjusting formulas or mandating expenditures. Remedies are more
appropriately found in the political process, by exhorting a fairness standard for
the legislature to adopt, or by providing citizens with the opportunity to opt out
of traditional and inadequate public school structures.
II. INTRODUCTION
Education rights proponents have utilized the courts to challenge states'
discretion with regard to its public school financing and spending policies and
practices since the late 1960s. The first cases challenged funding discrepancies
between various local school districts. Plaintiffs argued that the funding
discrepancies between the affluent suburban school districts and the poorer urban
school districts on a per-pupil basis were violative of the federal and state
constitutional guarantees of equal protection, as well as a denial of the
fundamental, i.e., constitutionally guaranteed, right to a public education.6
While the Supreme Court declined to agree that the right to an education is
fundamental or that funding disparities of local school districts are violative of

6. Some commentators have distinguished between the cases brought along federal equal
protection theories and those brought under theories of state constitutionality, whether it be under
state equal protection guarantees, state constitutional guaranty clauses, or under the education clauses
of the particular state constitutions. See, e.g., William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of
the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform

Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219 (1990).
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equal protection under the federal Constitution,' several states have ruled that
such funding discrepancies are violative of their own state constitutions.
Generally, these state court actions have been brought under theories of
what has been termed "fiscal equity" or "fiscal neutrality" litigation. Statewide
school funding schemes are usually based on revenue from federal, state, and
local funding. While federal and sometimes state funding can be tied to a fixed
or equal per-student amount, the portion of school income based on local taxes
can vary greatly depending largely upon the strength or weakness of the
property tax base as these taxes are generally raised through a property levy.
Plaintiffs in these actions have posited that simply because a particular school
district's tax base is weaker or smaller and thus draws in less revenue than a
school district with a more affluent or stronger tax base, it is inequitable to
"penalize" the school districts with the weaker tax bases by tying a significant
portion of the district's funding to local taxes, hence the terms "fiscal equity"
and "fiscal neutrality." Proponents of the variations in funding to school
districts maintain that local taxes are a reasonable decision of local government
policy and urge that the affluent or suburban districts' decision to spend greater
amounts on per-pupil expenditures because their relatively stronger tax bases
should not be impinged upon by state government.
Among the states where the courts have found public school funding
schemes unconstitutional on the issue of "fiscal equity" or "fiscal neutrality" are
12
°
Washington," West Virginia,
California,' New Jersey,9 Connecticut,
3
4
5
6
7
Wyoming,'
Arkansas,'
Texas,1
Kentucky,'
Montana,
and
Tennessee."' Similar actions, however, have been unsuccessful in at least
fifteen states, including
Arizona, 9 Idaho,2" Oregon, 2'
Ohio,22

7. The United States Supreme Court, in San Antonio IndependentSchool District v. Rodriguez,
considered and rejected both arguments that (1) education is a fundamental right either explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution, and (2) wealth is a protected group such that any
differences in educational spending is subject to strict scrutiny analysis. For a further discussion of
the Court's holding in Rodriguez, see infra notes 54-73 and accompanying text.
8. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
9. Robinson v. Cahill, 339 A.2d 193 (N.J. 1975).
10. Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977).
11. Seattle Sch. Dist., No.1 v. Washington, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978).
12. Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
13. Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 824 (1980).
14. DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983).
15. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
16. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
17. Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Montana, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989).
18. Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993).
19. Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973).
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Pennsylvania,23 Georgia,'A Colorado,'
New York,'
Maryland,V
Oklahoma,' South Carolina," Wisconsin," Kansas, 3 and Minnesota.32
More recently, the focus of challenges to statewide funding mechanisms has
switched from equity in per-pupil spending to the actual "adequacy" of the
education provided. In these suits, the aim of the litigation is essentially to
adjudicate whether the qualitative nature of particular states' public education
systems provides students with an adequate education. While a court rarely
evaluates the overall uniformity of education across school districts, it is usually
asked to determine that the children in disadvantaged districts are not obtaining
an adequate education. This litigation strategy, with some variation, has
succeeded in New Jersey, 33 Connecticut,' Alabama,35 Massachusetts,s and
Pennsylvania.37 The courts of Kansas' and Illinois39 have rejected such
claims, reserving issues of educational adequacy and uniformity for the state
legislature. Most recently, this strategy also appears to be working in the New
York Court of Appeals. 0 This recent decision, which was remanded for fact

20. Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975).
21. Olsen v. Oregon, 554 P.2d 139 (Or. 1976).
22. Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015
(1980).
23. Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979). But see Pennsylvania Human Relations
Comm'n v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 638 A.2d 304 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994).
24. McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981).
25. Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982).
26. Board of Educ., Levittown v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982), appeal dismissed,
459 U.S. 1138 (1983).
27. Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983).
28. Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. v. Oklahoma, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1985).
29. Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988).
30. Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989).
31. Unified Sch. Dist. v. Kansas, 885 P.2d 1170 (Kan. 1994).
32. Skeen v. Minnesota, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993).
33. Abbott v. Burke,'575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990) (holding that the Public School Education Act
violated the "thorough and efficient" clause of the New Jersey Constitution by failing to provide that
poorer urban districts provided a thorough and efficient education to their students, thus preventing
them from full participation as citizens).
34. Sheffv. O'Neill, 609 A.2d 1072 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1992).
35. Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1993) (advising that the state
legislature was obliged to comply with an order of the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, in
Alabama Coalitionfor Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, stating that an equitable education must be provided for
all school children).
36. McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office, 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993).
37. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 638 A.2d 304 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1994).
38. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. Kansas, 885 P.2d 1170 (Kan. 1994).
39. Committee for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 641 N.E.2d 602 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
40. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New York, 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995).
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finding at the trial level, is significant because of that court's historically strong
stand against "fiscal equity" as a means of eliminating discrepancies in the
41
funding of school districts throughout the state.
In light of this ongoing expansion of educational litigation, the issue arises
about the impact of the Supreme Court's failure to include education among the
fundamental and thus guaranteed rights of its citizenry when it had the
opportunity to do so. There is no doubt that advocates of education rights in
state courts have created and influenced educational policy and spending in many
states that would have been very difficult to accomplish through the more direct
legislative process. Indeed, the issue of whether a federal entitlement might be
created if the Supreme Court were to reconsider the question remains to be
pondered.
The authors contend that without the guidance of the Supreme Court, the
states have reached different results regarding significant policy decisions of
national importance in an area of fundamental significance to our citizenry: i.e.,
the right to public and free education. These policy decisions include:
education as a fundamental right; the appropriateness of variations in local
school district spending on a per-pupil basis; and, more recently, the right to
some "adequate" level of education over and above some minimum right to be
present in the classroom. Indeed, notwithstanding the Rodriguez decision, the
judicial struggles remain important and serious as these education rights groups
continue to utilize the judicial process to secure rights and form policy by
prodding legislatures to improve the quality of public education. While there is
no consensus among the states as to the fundamental nature of public education,
the authors will address the issue of whether it is wise to allow individual states
to determine the right to acquire an education. Moreover, the reliance on the
courts to create educational policy also raises serious questions as to both
federalism and the separation of powers.
Did the Supreme Court act correctly in deciding Rodriguez? Some
commentators have concluded that by utilizing theories of justice and equality
external to the Constitution,42 the Court could have reached a different
decision, akin to what occurred in Brown v. Board of Education.4 3 In
hindsight, while a decision in favor of the plaintiffs may have avoided much

41. Id. at 667-68.
42. See, e.g., David A.J. Richards, Equal Opportunity and School Financing:Towards a Moral
Theory of ConstitutionalAdjudication, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 32 (1973); James R. Hackney, Jr., The
PhilosophicalUnderpinningsof Public School FundingJurisprudence,22 J.L. & Educ. 423 (1993).
43. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). This decision invalidated the doctrine of separate but equal, the law
of the land since Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), and in particular as it applied to
educational facilities. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
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funding disparity litigation at the state level, there is no assurance that, given the
complexity of state formulas, federal litigation could have disposed of basic
questions. In addition, while an apparatus for overseeing state formulas might
possibly have been developed, there is no sense that a beneficial result for
students would have emerged. Indeed, even if "fair formulas" could have been
found, a process about which we are not sanguine, it does not appear that the
Court would have given direction and instruction to states as to what that
fundamental right to an education would require.
We also believe that while it is possible that lawsuits brought in the state
courts based on state constitutions might have had a positive impact on the issue
of fairness of funding, a crisis in education remains.' That crisis in public
education, as the new direction of education litigation indicates, is about the
effectiveness of the education itself. It is the authors' belief that our society can
no longer use state or federal courts to provide citizens an appropriately
fundamental education and the opportunity to build on that education. The
remedy needed goes beyond judicial remedy. A popular sense of common
urgency must occur and grip the political branches of our government.45
Inadequate school districts will not become adequate by the infusion of funds.
Even direct intervention by state offices within local districts is not enough.
Furthermore, granting parents the opportunity to have satisfactory alternatives
outside the typical form of public schooling remains the most easily enforceable.
Charter schools, public school choice, and voucher plans are attractive
alternatives to investing in failing government schools. Those options are more
appropriate than judicial damages since they come closer to granting immediate
relief to aggrieved parties.
After a review of the leading decision regarding the fundamental right to
education by the Supreme Court, we then discuss how the state courts have
responded to that decision in their own jurisprudence, thus providing the reader
with an overview of the case law in this area. We then consider the issue of
whether the Supreme Court in Rodriguez took the most appropriate stand, given
the state of public education today. Did the position the Court took in Rodriguez
leave the state courts with sufficient guidance to rule on similar issues raised in
the state high courts? Additionally, this Article addresses the issue of whether

44. In an analysis of spending trends generated by these cases, one commentator suggests that
the real increase in funding has not occurred because of equity-based challenges. See Michael Heise,
State ConstitutionalLitigation, EducationalFinance, and Legal Impact: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 63
U. CIN. L. REv. 1735 (1995). He sees real increases in funding to be possible under "adequacy"
litigation. Id. at 1736-38.
45. With the passage of Goals 2000, the national act aimed at community-based school reform
to achieve higher standards, that sense of urgency does appear to be gaining some political
momentum, at least to a limited extent at the federal level.
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the state courts have done any better than the Supreme Court in responding to
the needs of public education through "adequacy" litigation, and whether in fact
the issues raised by public education are amenable to constitutional adjudication.
Underlying these issues is the greater issue of judicial restraint and activism
based on the assumption that the judiciary takes power away from the legislative
and executive branches of the government and can give rise to a conflict among
the branches.

HI. RODRIGUEZ

AND ITS PROGENY

A. Passing the Burden to State Governments: A Review of Several State
Decisions ConsideringFunding DiscrepanciesBased on Local Taxation
Most discussions of educational finance reform litigation begin with an
overview of Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I),' which predated the Supreme
Court's Rodriguez decision by two years. In 1971, California's Supreme Court
became the first state high court to declare that a system of finance for public
education, based in part on local taxing practices which permitted a large
disparity in per-pupil funding among the various districts, was unconstitutional
under both the federal and state Constitutions.47
In Serrano I, the California Supreme Court was asked to decide the
constitutionality of the school funding system. The plaintiffs in the lower court
urged that a system that resulted in different per-pupil spending violated the
equal protection laws of the federal as well as the California Constitution.s
The high court agreed, holding that once the state chooses to provide education
to its citizens, it must do so in a generally fair manner, and not based on district

wealth even if only partially based on district wealth. 9 Finding that "rich"
districts did spend more per-pupil than "poor" districts, the court ruled that the
state public school financing scheme was unconstitutional.' °

46. 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (Serrano1).
47. Id. at 1266. See also Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D.C. Minn. 1971)
(holding, prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in Rodriguez, that a state wide funding scheme was
unconstitutional).
48. Serrano I, 487 P.2d at 1266. This decision was the first to address the issues of the
constitutionality of California's state-wide school district funding scheme. The court held that if the
allegations in the complaint were found to be true by the trial court, then the system would have
been in violation of the state and federal equal protection provisions. Id. at 1266. The legislature
did not actually await such a finding because of the high likelihood that the lower court would so
find and thus addressed the problems with the finance scheme immediately upon the court's decision.
This matter needs to be distinguished from Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) (Serrano
11). In Serrano II, the California Supreme Court addressed the legislative response to its earlier
decision in SerranoI. Id. at 930.
49. Serrano 1, 487 P.2d at 1264-66.
50. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1264-66 (Cal. 1971).
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The decision in Serrano I was based on federal and state equal protection
provisions." The court reasoned that because the system failed to provide its
students with some equality of resources and thereby discriminated on the basis
of wealth, it violated the state constitution as well as the federal Constitution.52
In doing so, the court rejected the government's argument that each school
district was free to raise as much revenue as its taxpayers wanted. 3 Besides
being the first state supreme court decision to address the issue of disparity in
a school system's funding practices and decide in favor of the plaintiffs, the
Serrano I decision is also significant in that it agreed with the plaintiffs that
education was among those basic rights guaranteed citizens.
After the Serrano I decision, the United States Supreme Court considered
similar issues concerning education rights. The Court's seminal decision
regarding an individual's right to education is Rodriguez.' In Rodriguez, a
class action was brought in federal court on behalf of children living in school
districts with low property tax bases.55 Because the Texas school financing
system relied partially on local property taxes, the class argued that such a
system was violative of the federal Equal Protection Clause in that it
discriminated against a definable class of "poor" persons, which the class urged
the Court to consider a suspect class worthy of strict scrutiny protections.56
It is important to note that prior to Rodriguez, state governments had
generally generated a significant portion of educational funding for local school
districts by using local tax levies in their funding schemes, which in turn had a
great impact on per-pupil spending and the variations thereof among districts. 7
This practice and policy of permitting localities discretion as to the use of their
locally tied and raised tax dollars is the norm in many local funding schemes,
including police, housing, sanitation, health care, transportation and other public
benefit services. In Rodriguez, the Court was asked to address the key states'
rights issue of state versus local government control of locally raised revenues
and resources.' Put another way, the difficulty for the Court, and for many
state legislatures, was in simultaneously requiring localities to raise funds and
then limiting that spending. Under more conservative viewpoints, this manner
of achieving "equity" would seem anathema to our system of democracy and

51. Id. at 1249.
52. Id. at 1254-55.
53. Id. at 1251.
54. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
55. Id. at 5.
56. Id. at 19-20.
57. Hawaii, for example, has a unique system of school district funding that has no local
government component but instead requires of the state a duty to provide wholly for a system of
public education. HAW. CONST. art X-1.
58. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50-51 (1973).
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federalism. Compounding this concern is the issue of the redistribution of
locally raised monies, which strikes similarly hard at the principles underlying
usual state practices encouraging local control over public schools. Rodriguez,
then, was about more than the right to education or even the fundamental nature
of education; it challenged an entrenched method of local finance and control
whose outcome stood to have substantial impact on the issue of state's rights.
The plaintiffs in Rodriguez, the parents of Mexican-American children
attending elementary schools in the Edgewood School District in urban San
Antonio, originally brought their action in federal district court where it was
tried before a three-judge panel. 59 They alleged that the Texas system of
school finance violated the Equal Protection Clause in several ways, including
differences in the quality of education, by making it a function of the wealth of
the local school district.60 As a result, differences in the material resources
between those districts with higher tax bases and the "poorer" districts occurred,
and they charged that it perpetuated marked differences in the quality of
educational services available to the youngsters. 61 The plaintiff urged the
district court to adopt a strict scrutiny analysis. 2 This argument rests upon the
plaintiffs' claimed status as a suspect class, based on their income relative to the
median statewide income and the incomes of families in affluent districts, as
well as the funding scheme's interference with the fundamental right of
63
education, through unequal distribution of financial resources.
The district court substantially agreed with the plaintiffs, ruling that the
Texas system of school finance did promote substantial disparities among the
school districts in terms of per-pupil spending and thereby resulted in invidious
discrimination against the poor." Accordingly, the court found this system to
be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. On appeal, the defendants,
which included the Edgewood School District, the State Board of Education, the

59. Id. at 4-5.
60. Id. at 28.
61. Id. at 25-26.
62. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973).
63. The Court explained that it applies a strict scrutiny analysis in reviewing legislative
judgments that interfere with either a fundamental constitutional right or where a suspect
classification or "protected class" is involved. Id. at 16-17. Where strict scrutiny is found to apply,
the state law or system is not entitled to a usual presumption of validity. Id. at 16. The challenged
legislative act or system must demonstrate that the challenged law or system has been structured with
"precision" and is "tailored" narrowly to serve a legitimate objective and that the legislative body
has selected the least drastic method for obtaining its objectives. Id. The challenged legislative
judgment carries a heavy burden of justification. Id. at 16-17. Because the Court found that neither
a suspect class nor a fundamental right was involved, the Court applied the much less stringent
"rational relationship to a legitimate state interest" analysis, wherein there is a presumption of
validity as to the statute or other governmental interest being attacked. Id. at 18.
64. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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Commissioner of Education, and the Texas State Attorney General, essentially
conceded that Texas permitted a dual system of financing which could not pass
muster under strict scrutiny analysis.5 They argued instead, that the matter
before the court involved neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification
and that a legitimate state interest was served by maintaining the statewide
educational finance system.'
The Supreme Court agreed with the defendants and reversed as to the
fundamental nature of education and the application of the Equal Protection
Clause. 7 The Court determined that the state government could enact
legislation that affects its citizens differently concerning how monies for
Delving into a long history of the
education were raised and expended.'
Texas Constitution and the state's development from an evenly distributed rural
population to extremely diverse urban and suburban populations,' the Court
nonetheless criticized the district court's reliance on the cases dealing with the
rights of indigents to equal treatment in criminal proceedings and on cases
disapproving of wealth restrictions in the right to vote.' The Court called the
district court's analysis "simplistic," and ruled that wealth was not a traditionally
suspect class under strict scrutiny analysis. 7' In a narrow five to four ruling,
the Court held, inter alia, that education is not among those rights afforded
explicit or implicit protection under the federal Constitution, and that one's
status which would invoke strict
financial status cannot give rise to a protected
72
scrutiny analysis under the Constitution.
1. State Courts' Holding That Funding Disparities Are Unconstitutional.
Handed this powerful defeat, proponents of education rights sought to undo
the impact of Rodriguez by following the lead of Serrano I in California, by
bringing actions on a state-by-state basis. Indeed, after the Court decided
Rodriguez, many state courts were asked to address the issue of the legality of
disparity in public school funding between "affluent" and "poorer" school
districts. Public school finance challenges have been consistently based on state
constitutional claims, alleging violations of both the fundamental right to an
education and the respective states' equal protection, guaranty or education

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 16.
Id. at 16-17.
Id.at 3.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodiguez, 411 U.S. 1, 3 (1973).
Id. at 9.
Id. at 18.
Id.at 19.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 3 (1973).
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clauses.' Moreover, the decisions of state courts discussing public education
availability and funding uniformly expand on the view of education as a basic
individual right under their constitutions.
One of the first state courts to address this issue, in an opinion released
only nineteen days after the Rodriguez decision, was New Jersey. 74 In
Robinson v. Cahill," New Jersey's high court, like California's in Serrano I,
also struck down a statewide financing system as unconstitutional because of its
partial reliance on a system of local taxation which resulted in the continuous
under-funding of "poor" districts relative to "rich" districts. 6 Significantly,
the high court did not rely on a federal equal protection or due process analysis
in reaching this conclusion, but instead relied on New Jersey's "education
clause," in holding that the current system of school finance failed to provide
the students in New Jersey's less affluent districts with a "thorough and
efficient" education, as required by that clause.'
While the court in Robinson expressed doubt about whether any system of
finance and funding based on local taxation could resolve the constitutional
violations the court found to have existed, it permitted the legislature an
opportunity to "redistribute" the local aid in such a way as to correct the
constitutional defects of the existing funding system. ' The court stopped short
of ordering a distribution of the appropriated tax monies in a constitutional
manner and left the legislature with this responsibility. 79 The court was
reluctant to broaden its rulings to include a specific remedy less it become
entangled in either the executive or legislative duties.s'
Several years later, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Robinson II
determined that the legislature had failed to heed its warning. 8' The court
ordered a provisional remedy for the 1976-1977 school year by adopting the
state governor's plan for the redistribution of the appropriated taxes, and
enjoined a distribution under the legislature's plan because the governor's plan

73. Many of these challengers to public school finance systems also argued that funding

discrepancies were violative of the federal Constitution's equal protection guarantees. This argument
has met with mixed success, but has been rejected as a basis for the federal courts by the United
States Supreme Court in Rodriguez. Id. at 3.
74. Tricia E. Bevelock, Public School FinancingReform: Renewed Interestin the Courthouse,
But Will the StatehouseFollow Suit?, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 467, 473 (1991).
75. 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
76. Id. at 297.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 298.
79. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 298 (N.J. 1973) (Robinson 1).
80. Id.
81. Robinson v. Cahill, 339 A.2d 193 (N.J. 1975) (Robinson II).
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for school funding fit "more conformably to the constitutional norm
Of import, and indicative of the problem of seeking judicial remedies to
issues that may be better addressed by the legislative branch, is that the
Robinson decision continued to require judicial oversight and involvement
several years after the original action was filed. In a variety of forms and
addressing several related issues, Robinson itself was in the courts of New
Jersey until 1976, when Robinson VI was decided.83 Litigation and controversy
between the courts and legislature in New Jersey, in fact, has continued for over
more than two decades, as will be discussed later in this Article.
In Gwinn Area Community Schools v. Michigan, 4 the United States Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether the Michigan State
School Aid Act was unconstitutional under both the state constitution and the
federal Constitution.u Although the matter was removed to federal court, the
court utilized state law. In Gwinn, the plaintiffs were a school district, a
student, and a taxpayer who were challenging the validity of a state school
funding formula as applied because it provided for a reduction in state funding
to schools which received federal impact aid.86
The plaintiffs argued that the matter should be compared to Plyler v.
Doe, where the Court found that the challenged state aid program had the
effect of totally denying children of illegal aliens a public school education.8n
However, the court of appeals relied instead on Rodriguez, and reasoned that the
Equal Protection Clause required only a rational relationship between a
legislative classification and a legitimate state interest.89 Finding that the state
had met its burden, the court ruled against the plaintiff-appellants.
As to
their due process claim, the court dismissed it with little discussion.
87

82. Id. at 200.
83. Robinson v. Cahill, 358 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1976) (Robinson VI). The permeations of
Robinson VWinclude: Robinson V, 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976); Robinson IV, 351 A.2d 713 (N.J.
1975); Robinson III, 335 A.2d 6 (N.J. 1975); Robinson II, 306 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1973); Robinson I,
303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
84. 741 F.2d 840 (6th Cir. 1984).
85. Id. at 841-42.
86. Id. at 841.
87. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
88. Id. at 215-19. The Court in Plyler has been criticized for applying a "heightened" level
of "rational relationship" to avoid the result of having the immigrant school children deprived of the
right to an education, and thus it has been said to "not fit neatly into previous structures of equal
protection analysis." Gwinn Area Community Sch. v. Michigan, 741 F.2d 840, 845 (6th Cir.
1984).
89. Id. at 844.
90. Id. at 844-45.
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In 1979, in Pauley v. Kelly,91 the Supreme Court of West Virginia decided
the issue of the constitutionality of a school funding system based on local taxes
as the high courts of California and New Jersey had, ruling that per student
spending discrepancies permitted by the existing funding scheme might be an
unconstitutional denial of one's equal protection and equal opportunity to
education.'
The plaintiffs in this action claimed that the state's existing
funding mechanism was discriminatory and denied them equal protection as well
as access to a state constitutionally mandated "thorough and efficient system of
schooling."' Besides agreeing with the plaintiffs that the discrepancies did in
fact rise to constitutionally unacceptable levels, the court remanded with
instructions that the state construct a "master plan" of how it would meet the
constitutional mandates for equal educational opportunity, including specific
areas of curriculum, personnel, facilities, materials and equipment.'
More recently, the Supreme Court of Texas undid the impact of the
Rodriguez decision in Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby.95 In
Edgewood, the court addressed the issue of whether certain undisputed facts
describing a public school financing system met the state constitutional
requirements of an "efficient" system of public schools.' The undisputed facts
indicated that disparities in district property wealth resulted in district per-pupil
spending varying from $2112 per student in the poorest district to $19,333 per
student in the districts with the strongest tax bases.'
The court based its decision on the Texas Constitution and rejected the
court of appeals conclusion that the question of whether the school system was
"efficient" was a "political question" appropriately within the realm of the
legislature.' However, the court did state that the remedy for an "efficient"
public system of education lies within the legislature's responsibility under the
constitution.' In essence, it was a right without a judicial remedy.

91. 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
92. Id. at 878.
93. Id. at 861.
94. Id. at 877.
95. 777 S.W.2d 391 (rex. 1989).
96. Id. at 392.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 393-94.
99. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397-98 (Tex. 1989). The
legislature's response to the mandates given to it by the court has not yet remedied the existing

constitutional flaws in the public school system of finance. See Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992) (holding that public school
finance system enacted after the first Edgewood decision was in violation of state constitution).
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In the same year, the Supreme Court of Kentucky examined similar issues
in Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc."
In Rose, the question
presented was whether a "common school" finance system was unconstitutional
as well as discriminatory because of the lack of parity in funding to all
districts."I
The court responded affirmatively, declaring education a
fundamental right, and ruled that Kentucky's system of public education c6uld
not continue to spend more in the affluent districts and less in others."1° The
court specifically rejected the argument that it was entering the legislative
function of government because its ruling meant the government would have to
spend more to comply. 3 Accordingly, it held that the public school system
based on its lack of uniformity and the disparity in district funding, was a breach
of the constitutional mandate that the state produce an efficient system of
common schools. "
The court also concluded that the state was spending
insufficient funds to accomplish this aim and noted additional spending would
have to occur to correct the insufficiency." 5 The court specifically rejected
the argument that its ruling violated the separation of powers."1
It could be
said that Rose shows how far judicial remedies can go toward forcing the hands
of legislators without the judges actually "disrobing" and taking up legislative
garb. 107
In Tennessee Small School Systems v. McWherter," the Tennessee
Supreme Court, striking down that state's funding mechanism, held that the
legislature had an obligation to maintain and support a system of free public
schools that "affords substantially equal educational opportunities to all
students.""9 Relying on the state constitution's equal protection clause, the
court ruled that the school funding system, forty-five percent of which came
from local funding, permitted too much of a discrepancy in per-pupil
allocation."' In the state's system, however, the discrepancy varied less than
inthe earlier and more egregious circumstances of California, New Jersey and
Texas: total funds available per-pupil for the 1987 school year averaged $2337
and varied from $1823 to $3669.'

100. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
101. Id. at 189, 196-98, 209.
102. Id. at 213, 215-16.
103. Id. at 213-14.
104. Rose v. Council For Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 213 (Ky. 1989).
105. Id. at 214.
106. Id. at 213-14.
107. See Michael A. Rebell, Fiscal Equity in Educauion: Deconstructingthe Reigning Myths
and Facing Reality, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 691, 704 (1995).
108. 851 S.W.2d 139 (renn. 1993).
109. Id. at 140-41.
110. Id. at 143, 156.
111. Id.at 145.
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McWherter is also significant because the Tennessee Supreme Court chose
to invalidate the state's public school finance mechanism not by applying the
intermediate level of analysis normally used by courts when concluding that such
systems are invalid, but by relying instead on a stricter test to reach the same
result. At least one commentator has noted that the stricter analysis adopted by
the McWherter court is "a harbinger of future analyses." 112 However, the
problem of an adequate remedy would still exist.
This development of a state-by-state approach to the adoption of education
as a fundamental or basic right is unsettling in terms of fairness on a national
basis. Additionally, it has not come about without a substantial price, both in
terms of the use of judicial as well as political resources. Judicially, the
evolution of an educational litigation strategy has meant that those seeking
"fairness" have had to rely on an adversarial process to achieve that end, and
to do so in repeated state forums that may or may not adopt the view that
education is a basic right and should be provided in a somewhat equal manner.
In terms of political costs, this process casts the quest for education in terms of
"liberal" and "conservative" paradigms that may not best serve the interests of
school children.
While the approach of pitting one group's interests against those of another
can be very effective for resolving disputes in the private sector, where personal
and basic political rights are involved, it is cumbersome and narrow. The
adversarial system fails to consider the common and long term good that a
broader approach of finding common entitlements would yield. Moreover, when
a particular state's judiciary adopts the view that significant financial
discrepancies in per-pupil spending among school districts within that state are
a breach of either state or federal constitutional law, the result is just as
frustrating. Even with a funding inequality, there remains the disturbing fact
that there is no valid measure of equality that can satisfactorily indicate what an
appropriate standard of education funding should be. The present wave of
adequacy litigation is strong evidence of that.
In each of these cases where the public school system of finance was found
unconstitutional, the remedies have ultimately been left to the state legislatures,
although some state courts appear to be more heavy-handed than others in
permitting legislatures to respond to their rulings. Thus far, these courts are in
agreement that while great disparity among school districts in terms of per-pupil
spending is unconstitutional, they have refrained from creating or implementing
plans of their own. New Jersey's high court seems to have gone further than
most by imposing on the legislature a plan drawn up by the executive branch.

112. See Rebell, supra note 107, at 701.
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More recently and with the emergence of "adequacy" litigation, however, courts
are being asked to evaluate a much more subjective quality of local elementary
113
and secondary public schools based on the efficacy of the education.
2. Courts supporting their states' funding schemes.
As the states of California, New Jersey, West Virginia, and Texas were
invalidating public school funding schemes based on their per-pupil spending
variations, other states were upholding similar schemes as constitutionally
proper. Some states made such rulings while upholding the constitutionally
guaranteed right to an education, finding it to be among the fundamental rights
of the state. In New York, for example, in Board of Education, Levittown v.
Nyquist," 4 the New York Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether the
state constitution required a "minimal acceptable facilities and services" in
public education in a challenge to that state's funding scheme which was based
partly on local taxes and resulted in per-pupil spending discrepancies among the
school districts. '
In Levittown, the plaintiffs, public school children and district school
boards, brought a suit for a declaratory judgment challenging the state provisions
for school financing pursuant to the federal and state Constitutions, as well as
the state constitution education article, which required that the state provide for
the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools." 6 The
significance of this challenge was not lost on the court of appeals:
At the outset it is appropriate to comment briefly on the context in
which the legal issues before us arise. Although New York State has
long been acknowledged to be a leader in its provision of public
elementary and secondary educational facilities and services, and
notwithstanding that its per pupil expenditures for such purposes each
year are very nearly the highest in the Nation, it must be recognized
that there are nonetheless significant inequalities in the availability of
financial support for local school districts, ranging from minor
discrepancies to major differences, resulting in significant unevenness
in the educational opportunities offered." 7

113. See Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1. v. Montana, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989). The
court held that as a result of the state's failure to adequately fund a foundation program, forcing
excessive reliance by local districts on permissive and voted levies, the state had failed to provide
an adequate system of quality public education as guaranteed under the Montana Constitution. K
at 690.
114. 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982), appealdismissed, 459 U.S. 1138 (1983).
115. Id. at 368.
116. Id. at 362.
117. Id. at 363.
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The court discussed the interplay between the three branches of
government:
The determination of the amounts, sources, and objectives of
expenditures of public moneys for educational purposes, especially at
the State level, presents issues of enormous practical and political
complexity, and resolution appropriately is largely left to the interplay
of interests and forces directly involved and indirectly affected, in the
arenas of legislative and executive activity."lS
The court, consistent with these comments, held that it was within the purview
of the state legislature to decide funding allocation issues." 9 The court also
found that there was no constitutional requirement that public education be made
available on an equal or substantially equivalent basis."2
Almost a decade after the New York Court of Appeals decision in
Levittown, a trial court for Nassau County, New York had the opportunity to
revisit the constitutionality of "extreme" funding disparities in that state's public
school funding system. The court begrudgingly followed the court of appeals
Levittown decision in Reform Education Financing Inequities Today v.
Cuomo.' In the REFIT decision, the plaintiffs complained of the inadequacy
and unfairness of the agglomeration of fifty-one different legislatively derived
formulas by which eight billion dollars was distributed among the state's more
than 700 school districts, resulting in "huge" disparities between "low-wealth"
and "high-wealth" districts.'22 The plaintiffs argued, however, that they were
not asking the court to overrule Levittown, but to consider the increasing gap in
per-pupil spending that had continued to grow since the court's earlier decision:
"Plaintiffs' theory on the case rests primarily on their belief that they come
within the narrow opening articulated in Levittown. More specifically, the
plaintiffs asserted that the 'gross and glaring' inadequacy the majority found
absent a decade ago, now exists."" 2 At the time the Levittown case was
decided, the most extreme per-pupil expenditure disparities were four to
one.'" At the time of the REFIT decision, the disparity had grown to six to
one in some districts."z The court based its decision upon the same grounds
that the court of appeals had used in Levittown, but made several references to

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
1991).

Board of Educ., Levittown v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 363 (N.Y. 1982).
Id. at 365.
Id. at 366.
578 N.Y.S.2d 969 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (REF/).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 972.
Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today v. Cuomo, 578 N.Y.S.2d 969, 972 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
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the possibility that it would entertain an adequacy action:
Apparently, the high state courts in New Jersey, Texas, Montana and
Kentucky linked the concepts of "efficient," "thorough," and
"uniform" to educational equality. Still, citizens may have difficulty
understanding why one state's "uniform" mandate means equal
educational opportunity, while another state's "common" mandate
demands only a minimum skills education.... Until such time as we
address the issues of maximizing facilities, curriculum, school terms
and motivation of teachers and students together with a reasonable
formula for financing the public school system, can we hope for
meaningful improvement in the education of our children."
On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiffs' claims
essentially ruling that the issues presented had been disposed of in the Levittown
decision approximately thirteen years earlier.'" However, apparently taking
note of the lower court's reference to the adequacy issue in its opinion, the case
was remanded back to trial for a resolution of that issue. 128
The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the equal opportunity for education
as fundamental under its constitution while simultaneously upholding a system
of public school funding that admittedly resulted in certain school districts
having inadequate funds to provide special programs for impoverished students.
In Kukor v. Grover,"2 the court found no violation of a uniformity
requirement in the state constitution, nor did it find that funding discrepancies
based on the financial strength of a school district's tax base violated the equal
protection clause of the state constitution' 3° In a strongly worded opinion, the
court made clear that equal opportunity for an education is protected as
fundamental and that opportunity was not the same as equality in per-pupil
spending.13' In permitting the localities to control spending as "rationally
based upon preservation of local control over education," that court appeared to
rule that, absent a complete denial of education to students in the poorer
32
districts, the matter was one for the legislature to resolve)
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that among the states the issue of what the
constitution says about education rights for its citizen is quite different, with

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 975-76.
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New York, 631 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1995).
Id. at 567.
436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989), reh'g denied, 443 N.W.2d 314 (Wis. 1989).
Id. at 570.
Id.
Id.
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legislatively derived formulas being held to very different standards under state
constitutional law. Moreover, any discussions of the trends in courts may be
premature. Recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court declined to strike its
funding scheme as unconstitutional despite substantial variations in per-pupil
spending derived from its funding formulas."
A review of these decisions indicates that without the guidance of the
United States Supreme Court, there has been no consensus among the state
courts as to what constitutes an acceptable non-discriminatory system of public
school finance. In addition, the courts have also demonstrated difficulty in
determining what constitutes an "adequate" education. There have been several
recent cases in this area that have demonstrated the difficulties for the courts.
An analysis of these cases follows.
B. Fairness in Spending versus Local Control: No Easy Solution
A review of the financial equity cases indicates that the solution to dealing
with the problem for urban and poor school districts does not lie simply in the
reallocation of tax dollars in search of a "fairer" method of distribution. The
courts of several states have sought generally equal per-pupil spending while
other state courts have considered school funding issues to be issues of local
legislative concern. School districts may fail to educate adequately whether they
adhere to judicially imposed financial equity plans or not. For while individual
schools may excel, few if any school districts, particularly within the large urban
cities, function to the satisfaction of teachers, education advocates, or students.
The judicial decisions that support the "fiscal equity" philosophy attempt
to deal with the politically disadvantaged issue of the desperate state of urban
and poor school districts through a proactive and unaccustomed role for courts.
It is a role, moreover, that has not yielded gains in pupil performance.
As a result, educational advocates have increasingly attempted to address
some of the deficiencies of funding equity litigation by requesting that the courts
require educational "adequacy" as opposed to financial fairness in the
distribution of educational resources. In the next Section, the authors review
some of these cases which constitute the trend in education rights litigation.
C. Adequacy Litigation: Widening the Gap Between the States
Many reviewers have labelled the more recent strategy in education
litigation as "adequacy" litigation. This litigation challenges the qualitative

133. Skeen v. Minnesota, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993).
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nature of the right to an education, and promises to both secure new rights for
students as well as put a new layer of obligations on state legislatures, and
subsequently, state education departments. 134
Eighteen years after the New Jersey Supreme Court first reviewed the aid
formula and found it unconstitutional, that court was presented with a related but
distinct issue in Abbott v. Burke.' 35 The court addressed the issue of whether
the constitutional right to a "thorough and efficient" education in New Jersey
required funding to the various school districts at the same level, regardless of
whether those districts were "property rich.""
The court also addressed the
issue of whether the level of funding had to be adequate to provide for the
special educational needs of the poor urban districts in order to address their
37
extreme disadvantages. ,
The court answered these issues in the affirmative, holding that the finance
provisions of the Public School Education Act, passed after the court had
originally struck down the prior school funding act, did violate the constitutional
right to a thorough and efficient education."' The court found this violation
prevented students from poorer districts from full participation as citizens and
from an ability to compete in the work place.'39 The court's remedy was to
order that the state education funding law be amended, or new legislation
passed, to assure that the "poorer urban districts' educational funding is
substantially equal to that of property rich districts.""*
This was the first time that a state's highest court informed its legislature
that an adequate education is one that offers more than some minimal
generalized standard of education and that the constitutional requirement to a
thorough and efficient education would not be met by some minimum, basic
instruction: 141
It is clear to us that in order to achieve the constitutional standard for
the student from these poorer urban districts-the ability to function in
that society entered by their relatively advantaged peers-the totality
of the districts' educational offering must contain elements over and

134. See Michael Heise, State Constitutions,School FinanceLitigation, and the "ThirdWave':
From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1151 (1995).
135. 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
136. Id. at 363.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 389.
139. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 389'(N.J. 1990).
140. Id. at 408.
141. See Patricia F. First & Louis F. Miron, The Social Construction of Adequacy, J.L. &
EDUC. 421 (1991).
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above those found in the affluent suburban district. If the educational
fare of the seriously disadvantaged student is the same as the "regular
education" given to the advantaged student, those serious
disadvantages will not be addressed, and students in the poorer urban
districts will simply not be able to compete. A thorough and efficient
education requires such level of education as will enable all students
to function as citizens and workers in the same society, and that
necessarily means that in poorer urban districts something more must
be added to the regular education in order to achieve the command of
the Constitution. 42
In short, the court was directing the legislature to shift resources and fund poor
districts in a way that the legislature had clearly not intended nor desired to do.
This decision caused a political struggle in New Jersey between the court and
the legislature.
Other courts have expanded upon the direction of the New Jersey Supreme
Court, thereby building their own constitutional requirements for education. For
example, the Superior Court of Connecticut, relying heavily on the New Jersey
Supreme Court's opinion in Abbott v. Burke, held that the allegation by plaintiffs
that they had been deprived of minimally adequate education as a result of the
conditions of racial and economic segregation required a judicial determination
as to whether the state constitution required a particular substantive level of
education. 43 Although the court did not address the actual issue, its finding
the issue as a justiciable one was significant because, like Abbott, it discussed
the appropriateness of a court's examination into areas of the quality of
education.
Three more recent opinions, in Alabama, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania,
all indicate that plaintiffs will continue to urge state courts to consider issues of
adequacy in education in a way that was, prior to Abbott, unattempted or
unsuccessful. In Alabama, for example, the state's senate requested an advisory
opinion from the justices of the Alabama Supreme Court because of a state
circuit court opinion in Alabama Coalitionfor Equity, Inc. v. Hunt.'" In
Hunt, the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the Alabama system of
public schools violated the state constitution because the public schools failed to
provide equitable and adequate opportunities to all school children.4 5
Significantly, in that action, the plaintiffs used qualitative measures of
educational adequacy, while the state maintained that the equity or adequacy of

142.
143.
144.
145.

Abbott, 575 A.2d at 402-03.
Sheffv. O'Neill, 609 A.2d 1072, 1076 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1992).
624 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1993).
Id. at 107.
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Alabama's public schools was entirely a matter of legislative discretion.'"6

The measures included minimum standards promulgated by the Alabama
Department of Education as well as the Southern Association of Colleges and
47
Schools.
The court agreed with the plaintiffs noting that the Alabama Education
Improvement Act included a revised method for state accreditation and
additional sources of "qualitative state standards for Alabama."'"
It
concluded therefrom that:
Each of these state documents represents an acknowledgement of the
present inadequacy of Alabama Schools by the state and speaks of the
need for major, structural change according to the standards and
requirements outlined therein ....
The Court finds, based on this
evidence and that set out below, that Alabama schools today fall far
short of the very educational standards that the State of Alabama has
determined are basic to providing its schoolchildren with minimally
adequate educational opportunities."
Accordingly, the court required that the legislature comply with the circuit court
order to provide its school children with substantially equitable and adequate
educational opportunities. 0
This decision has a clear and direct impact upon the legislature's taxing
authority and budgetary process. Nonetheless, the fact that the decision blurs
the differences in the functions of the legislative and judiciary branches does not
appear to have dissuaded the justices from reaching this decision.
The Massachusetts high court reached substantially the same conclusion in
McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office.'
In McDuffy, sixteen students
from sixteen different school districts sued the state Office of Education for
failure to comply with the constitutional obligation to provide an "adequate"
education. 52 The court found in favor of the students, finding that the state
was in violation of its duty to provide all public school students with such an
education where the evidence supported the conclusions that students in the less
affluent school districts were offered significantly fewer educational

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 107-08.
Id.
Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 108 (Ala. 1993).
Id.
Id. at 109.
615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993).
Id. at 517-18.
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opportunities and lower educational quality than students in districts with the
highest per-pupil spending.' 3 The court concluded by listing factors which
determined what qualified as an adequate education, including oral and written
skills, knowledge of economic, social, and political systems, understanding of
governmental processes, grounding in the arts, occupational training or
preparation for advanced training in academic or vocational fields to enable
students to compete favorably with counterparts in surrounding states."s
Pennsylvania's Supreme Court, in a case dealing with desegregation,
mandated that a court must look to student achievement results, among other
things, to determine whether equal educational opportunity had been made
available to all students within Philadelphia's public schools. 5' The court
concluded that:
The record amply demonstrates that the School District has not
provided to Black and Hispanic students equal access to, among other
things, the best qualified and most experienced teachers, equal physical
facilities, and plants, equal access to advanced or special admissions
academic course offerings, equal allocation of resources, or a
commitment to eliminating racial imbalances in the schools to the
extent feasible. "
Even in New York, where the court of appeals has consistently rejected
claims that funding disparities between urban and affluent districts deprive
students of their equal rights under the state's constitution, the court now
appears willing to at least consider an adequacy claim. In Campaignfor Fiscal
Equality, Inc. v. New York,'
the issue before the New York Court of
Appeals was not whether the funding disparity between affluent and less affluent
districts was unconstitutional, but whether adequacy could be litigated.l" The
court in Campaign allowed the plaintiffs to challenge whether the state had
violated its constitution on the grounds that the resources of a given district
could fall to such a level that the district could not guarantee the right to a sound
public education.'9 While not reaching the merits of the argument, it agreed
with the plaintiffs that, at least as a matter of pleading, a breach of the state's
education article with respect to New York schools was shown. 60

153.
154.
155.
Commw.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 552-53.
Id. at 554.
Pennsylvania Relations Comm'n v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 638 A.2d 304 (Pa.
Ct. 1994).
Id. at 328.
655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995).
Id. at 663.
Id. at 664.
Id. at 667-68.
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Accordingly, the court remanded the matter to the trial court to make a
determination as to the merits of the matter.'6' Interestingly, both Judge
Levine, in concurrence, and Judge Simons, in a partial dissent, agreed that it
was not the duty of the judiciary to participate in educational policy." 2
Hence, although the adequacy issue remains unresolved in New York State, it
appears to be an issue ripe for some kind of adjudication.
Other courts that have considered the adequacy issue have chosen to leave
this area to the discretion of their state legislatures. Those courts ground their
decisions on the rational relationship of local school district control to the
legitimate state purpose of preservation and promotion of local control of
education.
In 1994, the Kansas Supreme Court considered adequacy arguments in
Unified School District No. 229 v. Kansas.l1' The plaintiffs argued that the
School District Quality and Funding Act was unconstitutional because the
application of its uniform formulae and provisions to particular school districts
resulted in different funding allocations." In upholding the statute, the court
held that the right to education was not a fundamental one for the equal
protection challenge." Furthermore, the high court also specifically rejected
the plaintiff's arguments that the constitutional provision requiring the legislature
to make "suitable" provisions for school funding required the school district to
provide a quantifiable measure of education: "[the provision] does not mandate
excellence or quality .

. .

. In fact [the provision] . . . does not imply any

objective, quantifiable. . . standard against which schools can be measured by
a court."'" A determination of suitability was to be made according to
standards enunciated by the legislature and by the state department of
education. 167

In the same year that the Kansas Supreme Court handed advocates of
adequacy litigation its unequivocal defeat, an Illinois appellate court addressed

161. Campaign for Fiscal Equality, Inc. v. New York, 655 N.E.2d 661, 668, 671 (N.Y. 1995).
The court also remanded the matter on an issue apart from the state's education clause in the
constitution. Id. at 671. The court also supported the plaintiffs' claim on federal Title VI grounds,
ruling that Title VI, which bars discrimination under any program that receives federal financial
assistance, may in fact have been violated because the city received only 34% of state education aid
although the city has 37% of its students, with 81% of those being minorities, composing 78% of
the state's total minority student population. Id. at 670.
162. Id. at 671, 675.
163. 885 P.2d 1170 (Kan. 1994).
164. Id.at 1173.
165. Id. at 1188.
166. Id.at 1185.
167. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. Kansas, 885 P.2d 1170, 1188 (Kan. 1994).
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a similar issue. The court addressed the issue of whether the Illinois statutory
scheme for financing public education violated the state education article of the
Illinois Constitution based on the discrepancy in educational resources between
wealthier and poorer school districts." In that matter, the challenged system
allowed for differences in school district funding based on differences in local
property taxes.169 Plaintiffs pointed to differences in resources among some
school districts as evidence of the state's failure to provide students in poorer
districts with an "adequate education."" 7 The plaintiffs argued that because
Illinois' system was not "fiscally neutral," it violated both the equal protection
clause and the education article of the Illinois Constitution.'
Noting that the alleged constitutional violation did not rest on the adequacy
of the quality of education in a given district, but on the differences in benefits
and opportunities offered from district to district, the court held that the
elimination of economic disparity among school districts was a goal but not a
requirement of the Illinois Constitution." The court stated that:
The education article does not mandate equal educational benefits and
opportunities among the State's school districts as the constitutionally
required means of establishing and maintaining an "efficient" system
of free public schools. It does not make value judgments that foreign
languages are subordinated to computer science or music to home
economics. It does not require the same instruction in all schools. To
allege that certain educational resources are unavailable in poorer
school districts, or inferior to those in wealthier districts, does not
compel the conclusion that the funding provided by the State's
financing system is insufficient to provide an adequate education."
The Illinois court utilized the rational relationship test and held that as long as
the classification in the statute bears a reasonable relationship to a legitimate
legislative purpose, the court's function is not to substitute its own
judgment.

174

One problem with adequacy litigation is inherent in the term "adequate,"
because of a possible legislative and judicial disagreement regarding what
constitutes an adequate education. Moreover, adequacy also carries the risk of
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Committee for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 641 N.E.2d 602 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
Id.at 605.
Id.
Id.

172. Committee for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 641 N.E.2d 602, 605 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
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adhering to stagnant or fixed standards which may not best serve the needs of
students. "The concept of a minimum adequate education is subject to constant
change in our fast-moving society. A remedy based solely on adequacy
standards runs the risk of emphasizing adherence to outdated precepts or
involving courts in continuing modifications of remedial decrees to respond to
changing educational realities." "7s

IV. NON-JUDICIAL

REMEDIES

Fortunately, there is growing support for and a trend toward seeking nonjudicial remedies that hold hope for both the systems of public education as well
as the quality of public education overall. These alternatives give the remedies
to those who have the most at stake in public education, the children and their
parents. Moreover, not only do these extra-judicial remedies give children and
their parents choice and empowerment, but they also address issues of
educational inequities within the legislative process.
The three most commonly discussed alternatives to litigating the adequacy
of public schools are the creation of charter-schools, developing "schools of
choice," and installing voucher plans that allow parents options to deteriorating
inner-city school systems.176 Essentially, charter-schools are freed from many
of the bureaucratic rules and regulations of normal public school systems in
return for a commitment to meet explicit performance goals. They are
contractually established, wherein a managing authority, such as a large
corporation, civic group, labor union, or scientific or medical foundation,
manages a school with the sponsoring authority overseeing it, such as a state
education department, local school board, or other government agency. The
schools are given a charter wherein their goals and commitments are specified.
It is important to note that these schools are public schools and are funded
publicly. Since 1991, nineteen states have enacted laws enabling charterschools. "
A second alternative to the present method of public education also being
tried throughout the country is "schools of choice" programs. This alternative
also works within the public schools system, and creates open-enrollment and
open-district systems wherein students are permitted to enroll in schools other
than their "automatic" geographic school and even outside of their districts.
This system has several limiting factors, including space in the schools and

175.
176.
Viteritti,
"factory
177.

Rebell, supra note 107, at 705.
For a more thorough overview of each of these alternatives, see Diane Ravitch & Joseph
A New Vision for Public Schools, 122 PUB. INTEREST 3 (1996) (criticizing the current
model" of public schools systems and urging parent involvement methods of education).
Id. at 6.
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transportation in larger cities, but it is an alternative that can work in certain
areas and should be considered.
Third, the idea of vouchers has been around for some time, but is now
being tried in certain states with positive results. A voucher program allows
parents of school age children to receive a state voucher for value that they can
use at participating private schools. The fact that this method takes students out
of the public school system may make it the most controversial one, especially
where religious schools are permitted to participate in the voucher program. In
Wisconsin and Ohio, the voucher programs, passed "at the urging of minority
parents dissatisfied with the quality of education in inner-city public
schools,"'78 appear to have had a positive impact upon the quality of the
education the students are receiving.
Ineach of the three alternatives briefly discussed, a key element is parents'
and children's right to choose either how they will be educated or how the
money for education will be spent. All three alternatives thus create a stake in
the quality of the education not normally associated with the parents of school
children in the inner-city school district, where many of the most severe
problems with adequacy exist. In addition, these remedies are better at
addressing the problems of students and parents.,
. Remedies that direct additional funding to public school systems are not
efficient or effective ones. They, more often than not, punish the claimants who
brought the action when they are successful. Parents and children rely on funds
to actually produce a result which often does not occur. A remedy that puts
funding or resources directly at the disposal of the parent and student is much
more compatible with the legal tradition of rectifying the wrong done to the
aggrieved. A school district without adequate funding is only aggrieved because
children within the district are being denied an entitlement.
V.

CONCLUSION: WHERE THE COURTS LEAD,
THE LEGISLATURE WIL FOLLOW

Some observers note that there appears to be a trend in state courts to find
disparities in per-pupil funding based on local taxing formulas unconstitutional
on whatever grounds. However, we are left with the problems of enforcement
and oversight. This was exemplified in the case of New Jersey, where eighteen
years after the initial action was presented to the state supreme court in Robinson
I, the court was asked to revisit many of the same issues in Abbott v. Burke.

178. Id. at 10.
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That the courts are in for the long haul seems an undeniable, if lamentable,
state of affairs. Courts are involved with one major problem. Even if courts
decide that these issues are appropriately within their scope of review, much of
the remedial nature of these cases must be performed by state legislatures which
are hesitant to go as far and or as fast as the courts appear to be urging."7
Courts simply lack an effective enforcement capacity. While the courts can
point in a policy direction and exhort the political arm to perform its functions
with certain standards of equity or adequacy in mind, there really is no role for
the court. These are, after all, political choices."S
The problem is compounded by the fact that allowing state legislatures to
do their jobs and to provide for an adequate education as a fundamental right of
all students within its borders appears to be lagging far behind the need. Some
evidence that the federal government, at least the legislative branch, may be
willing to rethink the Supreme Court's conclusions in the Rodriguez decision
may be gleaned from passage of the Goals 2000 Act.''
The Goals 2000 Act was devised to foster "coherent, nationwide, [and]
systemic education reform" while balancing the principles of federalism in
education.l" Its purposes are threefold: first, to promote the achievement of
important national education goals by the year 2000; second, to raise student,
teacher, and parent expectations through high academic standards for all students
and in all schools; and third, to assist state and local education reform with
I s3
grants and greater flexibility to help more students meet higher standards.
While these are lofty and admirable goals, one has to wonder whether any
serious efforts at educational reform can be made within the few years prior to
the year 2000. So far, the impact of the legislation appears uncertain at best,
as our national test scores remain dismally below the average among
industrialized nations.'14

179. See generally Harry J.Walberg & Harry J. Walberg, I,Losing Local Control, 23 EDUC.
RES. 5 (1994).
180. We should not forget the lessons of a related area of litigation, that of busing actions
brought to enforce integration. This method tied courts up in the unintended role of overseer and
required the use of "consent decrees" as a remedy with its attendant problems of enforcement. This
remedy failed to provide for a foreseeable end to the oversight by the courts instead demanding
action by the executive branch. See Frank J. Macchiarola, The Courts in the PoliticalProcess:
JudicialActivism or Tmid Local Government?, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL CoMMENT. 703 (1994).
181. Goals 2000: Educate America Act, Pub. L. No. 103-227, 108 Stat. 125 (1994) (codified
at 20 U.S.C. § 5801 (1991)).
182. 20 U.S.C. § 5801.2(1) (1995).
183. Id.
184. For a further discusion, see Frank J. Macchiarola et al., The Judicial System and Equality
in Schooling, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming Spring 1996).
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One can only speculate as to the continuing impact that the Goals 2000
legislation may have upon current litigation strategies. Whether plaintiffs will
seize this law to urge that state courts adopt unintended remedies in the form of
further obligations upon already weary state legislatures remains to be seen.
Either way, the crisis in our states' public school systems as well as the political
crisis to which the state legislatures seem incapable of responding continue in
dire need of resolution. 185
Several commentators have urged that the Supreme Court's decision in
Rodriguez was wrong,'" and that we would have been better served as a
society had the Court held that the right to an education was indeed within the
unspoken rights of the Constitution. However, it is a credit to our system of
federalism that the various judiciaries of the states, even without the moral
compass of the Court, have tried to advance the cause of children. The results
speak for themselves. State funding remains an important determinative factor
in how well that child may or may not be educated.
The critical issue,
however, has more to do with the commitment to education rather than the tax
dollars expended in the effort.
Is the effectiveness of funding an appropriate issue to be addressed by the
judiciary? These authors think not, preferring to have some faith in the
legislative process that would presumably have a sincere and long-term interest
in the effective deliverance of education outside of the adversarial judicial
system. A return to local control and a greater freedom to experiment with
alternative forms of schooling appear to be working. With the changing mores
and political climate of present society, locally based remedies hold out the
promise of empowerment to the people most in need of sound public education
and educational alternatives.

185. The argument has been made that Goals 2000 will in fact "serve as a catalyst for the next
generation of educational litigation. . .. By converging with emerging legal doctrines forged by
school-finance litigants at the state level, educational standards, even voluntary ones, will attract
litigation designed to turn standards into legal entitlements." Michael Heise, The Courts vs.
Educational Standards, 120 PUB. INTEREST 55, 55 (1995); see also Michael Heise, Goals 2000:
EducateAmerica Act: The Federalizationand Legalizationof EducationalPolicy, 63 FoRDHAM L.
REV. 345 (1994).
186. See, e.g., Richards, supra note 42; First & Miron, supra note 141; Hackney, Jr., supra
note 42.
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